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CAN YOU UNDERSTAND THIS MESSAGE? 
AN EXAMINATION OF HURLEY V.  
IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN & 
BISEXUAL GROUP OF BOSTON’S IMPACT 
ON SPENCE V. WASHINGTON 
SANDY TOMASIK† 
INTRODUCTION 
A twelve-year-old student went to school wearing a red-, 
white-, and blue-beaded necklace.1  According to the child, she 
wore the necklace to show her support for the soldiers fighting in 
Iraq, some of whom were people in her family, and to 
demonstrate her love of the United States.2  However, upon 
arriving at school, she was informed that she could no longer 
wear the necklace because it could be considered “gang related.”3  
If she did not comply with this warning, she would be “subjected 
to discipline.”4 
The schoolgirl brought an action against the school district  
asserting that its policy and its enforcement violated her First 
Amendment rights.5  In analyzing whether this activity was 
protected as speech under the First Amendment, the Northern 
District of New York noted that one’s support for the soldiers 
might not express a particularized message.6  Moreover, the court 
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D., summa cum laude, 
2015, St. John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2013, St. John’s University. I would 
like to thank Professor Jeremy Sheff for his help and guidance with this Note and 
for being an invaluable mentor, as well as my friends and family for their support. 
1 Grzywna ex rel. Doe v. Schenectady Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F. Supp. 2d 139, 142 
(N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. The plaintiff began wearing the necklace in early January 2005, and the 
school told her to take it off on January 4, 2005. Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 144. This is the first factor in determining whether the First 
Amendment protects conduct as symbolic speech under the Spence test. See infra 
Part I.B. 
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stated that people do not automatically associate red, white, and 
blue with demonstrating support for the troops.7  Nevertheless, 
the court held that the claim withstood a motion to dismiss.8 
Conversely, in another instance, four non-profit 
organizations engaged in voter-registration activities in 
politically underrepresented communities.9  The New Mexico 
legislature passed legislation that restricted the  
voter-registration activities of third-party organizations, 
hindering the organizations’ ability to help citizens register to 
vote.10  These organizations brought an action alleging that this 
legislation violateed their right to free speech.11  The court found 
that the plaintiffs “pled facts sufficient to support their  
First-Amendment claims.”12  In deciding that the plaintiffs 
sufficiently pled First Amendment claims, the court first 
determined that the plaintiffs intended to convey a particularized 
message with their conduct.13  With the voter-registration 
activities, the non-profit organizations intended to convey a 
message that “voting is important, that the Plaintiffs believe in 
civic participation, and that the Plaintiffs are willing to expend 
the resources to broaden the electorate to include allegedly 
under-served communities.”14  Moreover, the court believed that 
people observing the voter-registration efforts would likely 
understand this message.15 
Each of the previous two cases highlights the difficulty of 
identifying whether conduct is protected as symbolic speech 
under the First Amendment and, specifically, how particularized 
the message needs to be in order to receive protection.  The 
original test for determining whether conduct could be protected 
 
7 Grzywna, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 146. This is the second factor in determining 
whether the First Amendment protects conduct as symbolic speech under the Spence 
test. See infra Part I.B. 
8 Grzywna, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 146–47. This ruling was on a motion to dismiss, 
and since the court found that there was “more than a ‘plausible contention’ that 
[the plaintiff’s] conduct [was] expressive,” the claim was not dismissed. Id. at 142, 
144–45. 
9 Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1189 
(D.N.M. 2010). 
10 Id. 
11 See id. 
12 Id. at 1214. This decision came on a motion to dismiss, and so the quoted 
language is the standard used in deciding such a motion. Id. at 1188, 1193. 
13 Id. at 1215. 
14 Id. at 1215–16. 
15 Id. at 1216. 
FINAL_TOMASIK 10/7/2015 7:13 PM 
2015] CAN YOU UNDERSTAND THIS MESSAGE? 267 
as speech was laid out in Spence v. Washington.16  According to 
the Court, to be engaged in protected speech, the actor needs to 
have the “intent to convey a particularized message.”17 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston18 potentially altered this test.19  There, the Court stated 
that a “narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition 
of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions 
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the 
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock.”20  
Therefore, the question has arisen whether the intent to convey a 
particularized message is necessary anymore, and the circuit 
courts have addressed this precise issue quite differently.21 
Because the freedom of speech is a fundamental right that 
has long been protected by the First Amendment,22 it is very 
important that the lower courts apply predictable tests when 
analyzing whether speech is protected.  This constitutional 
safeguard is necessary to assure the uninhibited exchange of 
ideas, ranging from political to social topics.23  In fact, “it is a 
prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not 
always with perfect good taste.”24 
This Note analyzes the effect that Hurley had on the Spence 
factors and suggests that the particularized requirement has 
been lowered.  This is the best approach to encouraging speech 
while balancing other important interests.  Part I discusses the 
development of the freedom of speech, from protecting the spoken 
and written word to protecting expressive conduct.  Part II 
outlines the different approaches taken by the circuit courts in 
deciding whether conduct is protected as speech and, in 
particular, what effect Hurley had on Spence.  Part III critically 
analyzes each of these approaches and concludes that the 
Eleventh Circuit’s approach is the most sound.  Finally, Part IV 
 
16 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (per curiam). 
17 Id. at 410–11; see also infra Part I.B (explaining the second prong of the test). 
18 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
19 Id. at 569. 
20 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 411). 
21 See infra Part II. 
22 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”). 
23 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citing Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
24 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941). 
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applies the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits’ tests to a 
district court case in order to illustrate the differences between 
the approaches and the importance of this problem. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SYMBOLIC SPEECH 
A. Recognition That Conduct Could Be Protected 
The Supreme Court first recognized that speech is not just 
limited to the spoken or written word in Stromberg v. 
California.25  In Stromberg, the appellant, a member of the 
Young Communist League, was convicted of displaying a red flag 
that represented her opposition to the government—an action 
banned by a state statute.26  On appeal from the District Court of 
Appeals of the State of California, the appellant claimed that 
“the statute was invalid as being ‘an unwarranted limitation on 
the right of free speech.’ ”27  The Supreme Court ruled that the 
statute was unconstitutional.28  The Court recognized that people 
could display such flags for peaceful purposes, such as to signal 
opposition to the political party in power, or opposition to 
government more generally.29 
A few years later, symbolic speech was protected again in 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.30  In 
Barnette, the appellees challenged a resolution ordering that 
saluting the American flag become a regular part of the school 
day and stating that refusal to salute the flag is 
insubordination.31  The Supreme Court held that the flag salute 
was a form of speech.32  “Symbolism is a primitive but effective 
way of communicating ideas.  The use of an emblem or flag to 
symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a 
short cut from mind to mind.”33  The Court noted that the flag is 
a symbol of adherence to the present government, requiring an 
 
25 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
26 Id. at 360, 362. The pertinent statute read: “Any person who displays a red 
flag . . . in any public place or in any meeting place or public assembly, or from or on 
ahy [sic] house, building or window as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to 
organized government . . . is guilty of a felony.” Id. at 361. 
27 Id. at 364. 
28 Id. at 369–70. 
29 Id. at 369. 
30 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
31 Id. at 627, 629. 
32 Id. at 632. 
33 Id. 
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individual to communicate and accept the flag’s ideas.34  
Therefore, the mandatory flag salute contravened the First 
Amendment.35 
B. The Spence Test 
Once the Supreme Court decided to protect conduct under 
the First Amendment, it was faced with the question of when 
conduct should be protected.  In other words, was all conduct to 
be protected as speech, or did protection have to be restricted in 
some way?  That answer came in 1974 with Spence v. 
Washington.36  In Spence, a college student hung an American 
flag from his window upside down, with a peace symbol made of 
tape attached to the front and back of the flag.37  Following his 
arrest for violating a statute banning such behavior,38 the 
student testified that he affixed the peace symbol on the flag and 
displayed it as a way to protest the recent American invasion of 
Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University, and to 
demonstrate that he thought America stood for peace.39  A jury 
ultimately convicted the student for violating the statute.40 
The student challenged his conviction on the ground that the 
statute violated his First Amendment rights.41  In deciding 
whether the First Amendment protected these actions, the 
Supreme Court explained that it is “necessary to determine 
whether [this] activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication to fall within the scope of the 
First . . . Amendment[].”42  The Court looked at the circumstances 
surrounding the conduct:  The student’s actions coincided with 
the American invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent 
State, which were highly publicized.43  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message 
 
34 Id. at 633. 
35 Id. at 642. 
36 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). 
37 Id. at 406. 
38 Id. at 405–07. The statute read: “No person shall, in any manner, for 
exhibition or display: (1) Place or cause to be placed any . . . mark . . . of any nature 
upon any flag . . . of the United States . . . .” Id. at 407 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
39 Id. at 408. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 406. 
42 Id. at 409. 
43 Id. at 410. 
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was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood 
was great that the message would be understood by those who 
viewed it.”44  Thus, the First Amendment protected the student’s 
conduct as symbolic speech.45  This two-part inquiry to determine 
whether conduct is protected speech became known as the Spence 
test.46 
C. Hurley’s Statement 
Difficulty and confusion ensued following the Court’s later 
decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Group of Boston.47  In Hurley, parade organizers refused to allow 
an openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual group to march in a 
parade.48  In response to a First Amendment challenge by the 
parade organizers, the state court ruled that the parade had no 
common theme other than involving participants.49  The 
organizers were not selective in choosing participants, and they 
failed to circumscribe participants’ messages.50  Therefore, the 
parade lacked the expressive purpose necessary to fall under the 
First Amendment.51 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the 
parade was a form of expressive speech.52  The Court asserted 
that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition 
of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions 
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the 
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock.”53  
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that a private speaker’s 
action does not lose First Amendment protection just because it 
 
44 Id. at 410–11. 
45 Id. at 415. 
46 James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 
61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008). Often, the test is called the Spence-Johnson test 
because these factors were affirmed in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
See Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir. 2013) (calling the test 
the “Spence-Johnson factors”). However, this Note refers to the test as the Spence 
test. 
47 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
48 Id. at 561. 
49 Id. at 562–63. 
50 Id. at 563. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 566. 
53 Id. at 569 (citation omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 
(1974) (per curiam)). 
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contains “multifarious voices” or fails to have an isolated, “exact 
message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.”54  This 
statement has given rise to the split among the circuits regarding 
Hurley’s effect on the Spence factors. 
II. HURLEY’S EFFECT ON THE SPENCE FACTORS: THE CIRCUIT 
SPLIT 
A. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits: Applying Spence and Hurley 
Together 
The Sixth and the Ninth Circuits seem to apply the Spence 
factors together with Hurley’s statement that a “narrow, 
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional 
protection.”55  The Sixth Circuit took this approach in Blau v. 
Fort Thomas Public School District.56  In Blau, the court held 
that wearing one’s choice of clothing was not a form of protected 
speech.57  There, a school had instituted a dress code, which was 
challenged by a student as infringing her freedom of speech.58  
The student said she wished to wear clothes that looked nice on 
her, that she felt good in, and that expressed her individuality.59 
In analyzing whether the plaintiff could have a free speech 
claim, the Sixth Circuit indicated that claimants have to show 
that their conduct conveys a particularized message, and that the 
likelihood is great that those who view it would understand the 
message.60  According to the court, “The threshold is not a 
difficult one, as ‘a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a 
condition of constitutional protection.’ ”61 
 
54 Id. at 569–70. 
55 Id. at 569. 
56 401 F.3d 381, 388 (6th Cir. 2005). 
57 Id. at 389. 
58 Id. at 385–86. Among some of the things the new dress code banned were 
revealing clothing and baggy clothing; visible body piercings, other than ear 
piercings; clothes with holes in them; and tops with writing on them. Id. 
59 Id. at 386. In fact, the student specifically said that there was no “particular 
message” that she wanted to convey through her clothing. Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
60 Id. at 388 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per 
curiam)). 
61 Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 
U.S. 557, 569 (1995)). 
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However, even with a lower threshold, the court still found 
that the student was not engaging in a form of protected speech.62  
Instead, the student had only a “generalized and vague desire to 
express her . . . individuality,” something the First Amendment 
does not protect.63  Indeed, to rule for the student would 
eliminate the requirement that the conduct have an identifiable 
message and would also depreciate the First Amendment in 
cases where a particularized message is present.64 
The Ninth Circuit similarly applied the Spence factors 
together with Hurley’s statement in Kaahumanu v. Hawaii.65  In 
Kaahumanu, the Ninth Circuit held that a wedding was 
protected as symbolic speech.66  The Hawaii Department of Land 
and Resources required couples to obtain permits and satisfy 
other terms and conditions in order to have beach weddings.67  A 
pastor and an association that provided commercial weddings 
challenged the new requirements, claiming that the 
requirements unduly burdened their right to organize and 
participate in weddings, violating the First Amendment.68 
In determining whether the plaintiffs stated a First 
Amendment violation, the Ninth Circuit articulated that the 
amendment protects expressive conduct “so long as that conduct 
‘convey[s] a particularized message’ and is likely to be understood 
in the surrounding circumstances.”69  “A ‘narrow, succinctly 
articulable message’ is not required.”70  Using this standard, the 
court concluded that a wedding ceremony was a form of symbolic 
speech.71  According to the court, the particularized message was 
one about the couple, their beliefs, and their relationship to each 
other and to the community, as well as a celebration of marriage 
and uniting two people in a long-term relationship.72  First 
 
62 Id. at 389. 
63 Id. at 389–90. 
64 Id. at 390. 
65 682 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2012). 
66 Id. at 799. 
67 Id. at 794–95. The terms and conditions included a ban on alcohol, chairs, and 
tables, and a two-hour maximum to perform the wedding. Id. 
68 Id. at 793, 795. 
69 Id. at 798 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974) (per 
curiam)). 
70 Id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 
557, 569 (1995)). 
71 Id. at 799. 
72 Id. 
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Amendment protection for this activity could not be ignored just 
because actors combined “multifarious voices” or failed “to edit 
their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject 
matter of the speech.”73 
B. The Eleventh Circuit: The Liberalized Test 
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit sees Hurley as having 
relaxed or “liberalized” the Spence test.74  The Eleventh Circuit 
took this approach in Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland75 
when it held that raising a fist during the Pledge of Allegiance 
was expressive conduct.76  In Holloman, a child was punished for 
refusing to recite the Pledge of Allegiance.77  A day later, the 
plaintiff, a student at the same school, did not say the Pledge of 
Allegiance and raised his fist in the air during the pledge 
instead.78  When summoned to the principal’s office, the plaintiff 
explained that he raised his fist to protest what happened to the 
child the previous day, and the plaintiff was subsequently 
punished for his actions.79 
The plaintiff brought an action in which he alleged that the 
defendants’ actions infringed his First Amendment rights.80  In 
order to determine whether this action was speech, the Eleventh 
Circuit opined that Hurley “liberalized” the Spence test.81  The 
issue for the court was “whether the reasonable person would 
interpret [the conduct] as some sort of message, not whether an 
observer would necessarily infer a specific message.”82  Using this 
new test, the court concluded that at least some students would 
have recognized the raising of the fist as a protest over the 
punishment of the boy the day before.83  Even if students were 
not aware of this specific message, the raised fist expressed a 
“generalized message of disagreement or protest” toward either 
 
73 Id. (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
74 See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
75 370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004). 
76 Id. at 1261, 1270. 
77 Id. at 1260. 
78 Id. at 1261. 
79 Id. The punishment normally would have been three days of detention and 
the postponement of receiving a diploma until detention ended, but the plaintiff 
chose instead to get a paddling in order to receive his diploma. See id. 
80 Id. at 1259. 
81 Id. at 1270. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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the school or the United States.84  Although not specifically 
stated by the court, the other part of the test would seem to be 
whether the actor intended to convey some sort of message.85  
This also fits within the court’s observation that Hurley 
“liberalized” the Spence test. 
C. The Third Circuit: Spence Factors as Signposts and 
Eliminating the Particularized Requirement 
Some courts have concluded that Hurley eliminated the 
“particularized” aspect of the Spence test so that now the factors 
are “signposts,” rather than requirements; this is the approach 
the Third Circuit took in Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of 
Tenafly.86  In Tenafly, the Third Circuit held that Orthodox Jews’ 
act of attaching religious items known as lechis to utility poles 
was not protected speech.87  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Third Circuit stated that there was no language in Spence 
suggesting that (1) an intent to convey a particularized message 
that (2) would be understood by those who viewed it were 
necessary factors.88  According to the court, conduct would be 
expressive if, “considering ‘the nature of [the] activity, combined 
with the factual context and environment in which it was 
undertaken,’ . . . the ‘activity was sufficiently imbued with 
elements of communication.’ ”89  The court focused on two 
questions: (1) whether the actor intended subjectively for his 
conduct to communicate with people whom he expected to 
observe the conduct, and (2) whether observers would 
understand the message that the actor intended his conduct to 
convey.90 
 
84 Id. The court also hinted that the raised fist could constitute pure speech, 
meaning that the raised fist “does not contain any of the substantive ‘non-speech’ 
elements that are necessary to remove something from the realm of ‘pure speech’ 
into the realm of expressive conduct.” Id. Yet, the court concluded that the raised fist 
is still protected by the First Amendment, whether it is symbolic speech or pure 
speech. Id. 
85 See id. (concluding that the raised fist expressed a generalized message of 
protest or disagreement). 
86 309 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Troster v. Pa. State Dep’t of Corr., 65 
F.3d 1086, 1090 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
87 Id. at 155, 161. Lechis are thin black strips made of plastic. Id. at 152; see 
infra note 92 (explaining the purpose of lechis). 
88 Id. at 160 (citing Troster, 65 F.3d at 1090 n.1). 
89 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Troster, 65 F.3d at 1090). 
90 Id. at 161 (citing Troster, 65 F.3d at 1091–92). 
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Using this test, the court found that affixing the religious 
items to the poles was not expressive activity that would be 
protected.91  The Third Circuit found that the intended audience 
was not the general public, but rather other Orthodox Jews 
because it was for their benefit.92  Moreover, the items were not 
expressing a message that would be understood by anyone but 
instead were used for a purely functional purpose.93  Thus, 
because there was no message behind the hanging of these 
religious items that could be understood by the intended 
audience, the conduct was not protected as symbolic speech. 
D. The Second Circuit: Spence Factors as “Intact” 
Conversely, the Second Circuit believes that the Spence 
factors remain “intact” after Hurley.94  In Church of American 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik,95 the Second Circuit took 
this approach and held that wearing masks was not symbolic 
speech.96  In Kerik, members of the American Knights, a group 
that identifies with the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”), applied for a 
permit to demonstrate while wearing masks.97  However, the 
New York City Police Department denied the application on the 
ground that wearing the masks would violate a New York 
statute.98  The members sought an injunction against the police 
department to allow the group to wear its masks while 
demonstrating.99  While the decision denying the injunction was 
stayed, the group conducted its protest with robes and hoods but 
without masks.100 
 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 162. This is because the religious item was used to demarcate the 
boundaries within which Orthodox Jews could travel during a religious holiday. See 
id. at 152. 
93 Id. at 162. 
94 See infra notes 101 and 103 and accompanying text. 
95 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004). 
96 Id. at 205 & n.6, 208 (citing Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319 
(2d Cir. 2003)). 
97 Id. at 199–200. 
98 Id. at 200–01. The statute provided that a person is guilty of loitering when 
such person “[b]eing masked . . . loiters, remains or congregates in a public place 
with other persons so masked or disguised, or knowingly permits or aids persons so 
masked or disguised to congregate in a public place.” Id. at 201. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
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When the case reached the Second Circuit, the court stated 
that it had “interpreted Hurley to leave intact the Supreme 
Court’s test for expressive conduct in [Spence].”101  The Second 
Circuit reached this conclusion by citing Zalewska v. County of 
Sullivan.102  According to Zalewska: 
To be sufficiently imbued with communicative elements, an 
activity need not necessarily embody a narrow, succinctly 
articulable message, but the reviewing court must find, at the 
very least, an intent to convey a particularized message along 
with a great likelihood that the message will be understood by 
those viewing it.103 
Applying this standard, the court in Kerik found that the wearing 
of the masks was not protected speech because the mask itself 
did not convey a message independently of the robe and hood.104  
In other words, the audience would conclude that the members of 
the American Knights were associated with the KKK just by 
looking at the robe and hood; the mask did nothing to add to that 
impression.105 
III. RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHY THE ELEVENTH 
CIRCUIT IS CORRECT 
A. The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits: Correct Both 
Textually and Policy-Wise 
The Sixth and Ninth Circuit’s approach106 is textually sound.  
By first stating that the intent to convey a particularized 
message needs to be present, but then stating a “narrow, 
succinctly articulable message” is not required,107 these circuits 
have essentially lowered the particularized requirement, rather 
 
101 Id. at 205 n.6. 
102 316 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2003). 
103 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra Part 
III.C (pointing out the similarity of this statement to the Sixth and Ninth Circuit’s 
approach, but explaining why the Second Circuit’s test is different). 
104 356 F.3d at 206. 
105 Id. 
106 See supra notes 60–61, 69–70 and accompanying text. 
107 Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)); Blau v. 
Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 388 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Hurley, 515 
U.S. at 569). 
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than just clarifying it.108  In fact, the factual scenario in 
Kaahumanu closely mirrors the factual scenario in Hurley 
because, like a parade, a wedding combines multifarious 
messages, such as messages about the couple and their beliefs, as 
well as their relationship to the community and to each other.109  
Just as the point of a parade is to express a message,110 the core 
message of a wedding is a celebration of marriage and uniting 
two people in a lifelong relationship.111  Because the facts of 
Kaahumanu closely parallel the facts of Hurley, the Ninth and 
Sixth Circuits have correctly stated that Hurley lowered the 
threshold of the first Spence factor. 
The Sixth and Ninth Circuit’s approach was best phrased by 
the Eleventh Circuit, which explicitly stated that Hurley 
“liberalized” the Spence test by lowering the particularized 
requirement.112  In the Eleventh Circuit, the new test would be 
whether a reasonable person would understand some sort of 
message, not whether an observer would necessarily infer a 
specific message.113 
One of the benefits of the Eleventh Circuit’s test is that it is 
pragmatic.  An audience might not be able to understand the 
specific message the actor intended to convey, but the audience 
might be able to understand a different message.114  Yet, the 
conduct would still be protected as symbolic speech.115  This 
 
108 See infra Part III.C (distinguishing the Sixth and Ninth Circuit’s test from 
the Second Circuit’s test, which uses very similar language). 
109 Kaahumanu, 682 F.3d at 799 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70). 
110 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568. 
111 Kaahumanu, 682 F.3d at 799. 
112 Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569). 
113 Id. 
114 Compare Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (finding that a student had particularized the 
message of expressing her gender identity by wearing feminine clothing, and that 
the audience would understand that exact message), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton 
Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000), 
with Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1270 (“Even if students were not aware of the specific 
message Holloman was attempting to convey, his fist clearly expressed a generalized 
message of disagreement or protest directed toward . . . the school, or the country in 
general.”), and Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 320 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t 
is difficult to see how Zalewska’s broad message would be readily understood by 
those viewing her since no particularized communication can be divined simply from 
a woman wearing a skirt.”). 
115 See Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1270 (“Even if students were not aware of the 
specific message Holloman was attempting to convey, his fist clearly expressed a 
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strikes the right balance between protecting an individual’s right 
to free speech and the Supreme Court’s admonition that not 
everything can be considered speech.116  For example, the conduct 
of wearing a skirt to express cultural values in Zalewska would 
still probably not be protected under the Eleventh Circuit’s test 
because no one would understand that message, or any other 
message, from wearing a skirt.117  That could be contrasted with 
a situation like Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, in which 
the raising of a fist to protest another student’s punishment, 
which has some particularization, was protected because 
students could infer multiple messages, although not a particular 
one.118  Protecting speech where the audience does not 
understand the exact same message the actor intends to convey 
is beneficial:  An actor like the student in Holloman clearly 
intended to express a message, and protection should not hinge 
on the audience’s ability to perceive that same message, as long 
as it could understand some message from the conduct.  This is 
especially true if conduct could convey multiple messages, yet the 
actor intended to convey only one message.119 
One could argue that allowing an audience to understand a 
different message from the one the actor intended to convey does 
not serve the conception of the First Amendment as maintaining 
the “marketplace of ideas.”120  According to this theory, there is a 
seller with an idea, and there is a buyer looking for an idea.121  
All ideas should enter into the marketplace of ideas so that 
individual buyers can pick and choose which ideas to accept from 
sellers.122  Therefore, if an audience-buyer understands a 
different message from the one the actors-sellers intended their 
 
generalized message of disagreement or protest directed toward . . . the school, or 
the country in general.”). In fact, there is even a suggestion that Spence itself only 
required that the audience understand some message, not the particular message 
the actor intended the conduct to convey. Laurie Magid, Note, First Amendment 
Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 467, 486 (1984). 
116 See infra note 138 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.B–C 
(arguing that the Third Circuit protects too much conduct, while the Second Circuit 
protects too little conduct). 
117 316 F.3d at 320. 
118 370 F.3d at 1270. 
119 See Magid, supra note 115, at 478. 
120 See Robert A. Sedler, The “Law of the First Amendment” Revisited, 58 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1003, 1017 (2013). 
121 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
122 See Sedler, supra note 120. 
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conduct to convey, the marketplace of ideas is altered so that the 
roles of actors and sellers are not as important:  They do not have 
to put as much effort into communicating their exact message.  
Therefore, maybe the particularization of the conduct is 
important to this theory insofar as it helps an audience 
understand the exact message the actor intended to 
communicate. 
Yet, courts should not protect the marketplace of ideas at the 
expense of an individual’s autonomy.  The First Amendment’s 
primary and most important purpose is to “protect all forms of 
peaceful expression in all of its myriad manifestations.”123  “While 
not all cases provide a clear answer to [whether something is 
symbolic speech], courts should err on the side of protecting 
expression.”124  The courts have emphasized this on multiple 
occasions because they have recognized the importance of 
protecting an individual’s freedom, as compared to other goals.125  
In fact, to have a marketplace of ideas, individual autonomy 
needs to be protected:  Individuals must be willing to come 
forward with a message they would like to express in a 
marketplace. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s test protects individual autonomy as 
a primary goal in two ways.  First, actors’ freedom in expressing 
themselves through their conduct is protected by lowering the 
particularized requirement.  If there is a chance that their 
conduct will not be protected as speech just because it is not 
particularized enough, people may be deterred from engaging in 
such conduct.126 
Second, allowing the audience to understand a different 
message from the one the actor intended to convey protects 
individuals’ freedom in self-expression.  If an audience 
understands a different message from the one the actor intended 
 
123 Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) 
(citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977)). 
124 James M. Gottry, Note, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation Anti-
Discrimination Laws Take Aim at First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 961, 1000 (2011). 
125 See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 
270–80 (2011) (highlighting cases where the Supreme Court recognized the need to 
protect autonomy). 
126 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 78–79 (1988) (“The very 
likely prospect of [failing to protect the liberty of speech] would itself have an 
inhibiting effect on expression, for . . . many people will choose not to exercise their 
liberty for fear they would be the victims of those systemic failures . . . .”). 
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to convey, and the First Amendment would protect that conduct, 
people are more likely to express themselves.  This security, 
then, is important for protecting a person’s autonomy in  
self-expression. 
Because of this greater degree of autonomy, a larger, more 
diverse group of people can communicate with a wider variety of 
messages.127  This is particularly true because many people may 
not be able to express their intent in a particularized way, yet 
they may still have a message they want to convey.  It is 
especially true because conduct with a wide variety of messages 
will still be protected, so long as the audience can understand 
some message from it, even if that message is different from the 
one the actor intended to convey.128   
One may question how the court in Holloman arrived at the 
reasonable person standard, because Spence v. Washington 
requires that “those who viewed it” understand the message.129  
However, this was ambiguous in Spence, because the case itself 
suggested two different approaches.130  On the one hand, it could 
mean actual viewers, but the Supreme Court probably did not 
intend to limit the audience to this circumscribed class because it 
explicitly stated that nobody saw Spence’s flag before the police 
arrived to take it down.131  Also, the Court did not even consider 
the policemen who came to take the flag down as the audience.132 
On the other hand, “those who viewed it” could mean 
reasonable observers.  This standard is a practical approach, for 
two reasons.  First, it would be difficult to locate and interview 
actual observers about what they understood the conduct to 
mean.133  Second, if only one actual observer in an audience does 
not understand the message the actor intended to convey, would 
that mean the actor loses constitutional protection?  Surely, an 
actor should not lose First Amendment protection just because 
one audience member cannot perceive or understand that actor’s 
conduct.  This would especially be true if the message were not as 
 
127 Magid, supra note 115, at 467. 
128 See supra Part II.B. 
129 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam). This also mirrors the criticism of the 
Third Circuit’s statement that there was no language in Spence indicating that the 
two factors were necessary factors. See infra Part III.B. 
130 Magid, supra note 115, at 485. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 485–86. 
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particularized as Spence required before Hurley.  The Eleventh 
Circuit approach handles this problem by focusing on the 
reasonable observer. 
B. Criticisms of the Third Circuit: Potentially Correct Textually, 
but Not Policy-Wise 
While the Third Circuit’s test134 could be correct textually, it 
would not produce the wisest policy.  Textually, it could be true 
that Hurley eliminated the “particularized” requirement of the 
Spence test by stating that a narrow, succinctly articulable 
message is not a necessary condition.  Even if a “narrow, 
succinctly articulable message” is not equivalent to being 
“particularized,”135 that confusion was eliminated in Hurley, in 
which the Supreme Court stated that “a narrow, succinctly 
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional 
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 
‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably 
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock.”136  Thus, the Supreme 
Court may have indicated that a message no longer needs to be 
particularized in order to receive constitutional protection. 
There is room for debate whether eliminating the 
“particularized” aspect of the Spence test is a sound approach for 
adjudicating symbolic speech cases.  On the one hand, there is an 
argument that the First Amendment would protect more speech 
this way, without regard to how particularized the actors 
intended their conduct to be.137  On the other hand, it is just not 
feasible for the First Amendment to protect conduct whenever a 
person intends to express any idea at all.  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged this by stating that it “cannot accept the view that 
an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ 
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to 
express an idea.”138  If one were to take a literal reading of the 
 
134 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
136 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405, 411 (1974) (per curiam)). 
137 Of course, the less particularized a message is, the less likely it is that the 
speech will be protected because it would fail the second prong of the Spence test: If 
a message is not too particularized, there is a lower likelihood that those who view it 
will understand it. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
138 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
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first prong of the test and ignore pragmatic thinking, there could 
be no limit on what could be protected as speech under that 
prong if the actor did not intend to convey a particularized 
message. 
Thus, there could be a danger that protecting more conduct, 
and so safeguarding people’s autonomy, sacrifices other values 
that society deems more important than an individual’s right to 
self-expression.  A group could block a police station because it 
thinks that looking at a police station is important; a couple 
could walk hand-in-hand in the middle of Fifth Avenue because it 
believes publicly displaying affection is healthy for the 
relationship.  Yet, in each of these instances, there are overriding 
public interests, such as the ability to respond to an emergency 
and the need for traffic to move, respectively.  In such instances, 
these actions cannot be recognized as speech. 
A degree of particularization is the best tool for determining 
whether conduct should be protected, since it would guard 
against pretextual claims like the ones above while ensuring that 
other interests are protected as well.  An advocate of the Third 
Circuit’s approach might argue that such interests could also be 
served by a balancing test, eliminating the need for a 
particularization requirement.  For example, in United States v. 
O’Brien,139 the Court held, in part, that regulation of expressive 
conduct is permissible if the regulation furthers an important or 
substantial government interest.140  Similarly here, an advocate 
of the Third Circuit’s approach might argue that conduct could be 
protected as speech unless there is an important or substantial 
governmental interest that weighs against the individual interest 
of the speaker.  This approach is problematic for two reasons.  
First, a balancing test allows for even more discretion and 
uncertainty than an inquiry into particularization.141  Second, 
precisely because every individual has the ability to act and to 
come up with any message at all for the conduct, courts cannot 
afford to presume that all conduct is speech.  In short, some level 
of particularization is necessary to recognize conduct as speech, 
which is one of the benefits of the Eleventh Circuit’s test. 
 
139 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
140 Id. at 376–77. 
141 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals 
that it has applied a spectrum of standards . . . .”). 
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By eliminating the particularized requirement, the Third 
Circuit shifts the burden of determining whether conduct is 
protected as speech to the second prong of the test, which is 
audience understanding.  However, in the Third Circuit’s case, 
that prong is ill-equipped for that purpose.  Asking whether the 
actors intended for their conduct to communicate a message to 
people whom they expected would observe the conduct is 
confusing because it could blend actual and potential observers, 
which are two separate groups.  In other words, do the people 
who the actors expected to observe the conduct include actual 
viewers, potential viewers, or both?  For instance, by hanging the 
flag with a peace symbol from his window, the plaintiff in Spence 
presumably expected his neighbors to observe his conduct.  Some 
neighbors may have actually observed the flag, but maybe others 
did not, making the latter group only potential viewers. 
Blending actual and potential observers is an untenable 
position.  Asking whether the actors intended their conduct to 
communicate to actual observers might yield a different response 
than asking whether the actors intended their conduct to 
communicate to potential observers.142  The answer to this 
question could also differ from case to case, which leads to 
inconsistency in applying the test.  This is a problem unique to 
the Third Circuit, since other courts usually state which audience 
they are examining.143  Even in those cases in which courts do not 
specifically state whether they are looking at actual or potential 
observers, they at least identify a group as the audience.144 
Perhaps the Third Circuit would be able to use a few tools to 
make its determination, such as imputing an actual audience’s 
understanding onto a potential audience rather than surmising 
what the latter would understand.  Although this would be easy 
to apply, it does not seem fair because a potential audience could 
understand a completely different message from the actual 
 
142 See Magid, supra note 115, at 485 (stating that two different approaches are 
the actual observer standard and the potential observer standard). 
143 See Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 320 (2d Cir. 2003) (focusing 
on the “ordinary viewer”); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 
33162199, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (focusing on faculty and students by 
looking at their reactions to the plaintiff’s way of dressing), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. 
Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 
2000). 
144 See, e.g., Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (looking at “students”). 
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audience; this goes against the Third Circuit’s requirement that 
the audience understand the same message as the one the actor 
intended to convey. 
The only room for debate with the Third Circuit’s test could 
be whether Spence originally required that the audience 
understand the same message the actor intended to convey or 
whether the audience could glean a different message from the 
conduct.145  There is support for the suggestion that the audience 
would have to understand the same message the actor intended 
to convey.146  But again, this aspect of the Third Circuit’s test 
falls short for two reasons.  First, like the Eleventh Circuit 
provides, the protection of conduct should not depend on the 
audience’s ability to perceive the exact same message that the 
actor intended to convey, so long as it could understand some 
message.  This is especially true if the conduct could convey 
multiple messages, yet the actor intended to convey only one 
message.147  In that case, what are the chances that the audience 
would perceive the exact same message?  For example, if 
someone is wearing a red, white, and blue necklace and intends 
to convey a message about support for the troops, an audience 
could understand a message about support for the United States, 
not necessarily support for the troops.  It is more likely that 
someone would understand a message about the former rather 
than the latter.  Therefore, although this requirement would 
maintain the traditional marketplace of ideas because the actor’s 
role in expressing a message is more necessary, it would not 
maintain the actor’s autonomy, which should not be denied.148 
 
 
145 Compare Magid, supra note 115, at 486–87 (“Spence requires only that the 
observer recognize that the conduct expresses some message, not that he understand 
the particular meaning the actor intends.”), with Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4 
(finding that the student’s message of gender identity expression by wearing 
feminine clothing was understood by the audience). 
146 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam) (“An intent 
to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding 
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by 
those who viewed it.” (emphasis added)). 
147 See supra Part III.A. 
148 See supra Part III.A (discussing how requiring the audience to understand 
the same message as the one the actor intended to convey maintains the 
marketplace of ideas, allows the audience to understand a different message, and 
helps protect autonomy). 
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Second, requiring the audience to understand the same 
message as the one the actor intended the conduct to convey 
demonstrates an inherent contradiction in the Third Circuit’s 
approach.  On the one hand, the Third Circuit eliminates the 
particularized requirement, which would protect more conduct at 
the expense of other interests.149  On the other hand, the 
requirement that the audience understand the same message the 
actor intended the conduct to convey would recognize less 
conduct, because it is probable, more often than not, that the 
audience gleans a different message than what was intended.  
Therefore, the Third Circuit essentially seeks to recognize more 
conduct while recognizing less conduct at the same time, which is 
a contradiction unique to that circuit.150 
Additionally, for the proposition that there are other criteria 
to use to determine if the First Amendment will protect conduct, 
the court in Tenafly cited only one Third Circuit case, Troster v. 
Pennsylvania State Department of Corrections.151  According to 
Troster, there was no language in Spence that (1) an intent to 
convey a particularized message (2) that would then be 
understood by those who viewed it were necessary factors.152  
Although this is true, it still ignores the fact that those factors 
were relied on in Texas v. Johnson153 and Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence,154 as well as countless lower court 
decisions.155  Citing Troster is problematic because the Third 
Circuit’s new test could lead to many different, unanticipated 
problems, since it may not have been used much.  Even though 
the Spence factors are still “signposts,”156 the court did not make  
 
 
 
149 See supra Part III.B. 
150 The Eleventh Circuit (1) lowers the particularized requirement and 
(2) allows the audience to understand a different message from the one the actor 
intended to convey, both protecting more speech. See supra Part III.A. Conversely, 
the Second Circuit (1) keeps a higher particularized requirement and (2) requires 
the audience to understand the same message the actor intended to convey, both 
limiting what speech is protected. See infra Part III.C. 
151 65 F.3d 1086 (3d Cir. 1995). 
152 Id. at 1090 n.1. 
153 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
154 468 U.S. 288, 305 (1984). 
155 See, e.g., Church of Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 
205 (2d Cir. 2004); Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2003). 
156 Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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it clear how the factors would be used as signposts.  Conversely, 
at least the Spence factors have been tested on numerous 
occasions. 
C. Criticisms of the Second Circuit: Wrong Textually and Policy-
Wise 
If the Third Circuit’s test may have been correct textually, 
but not the best test in terms of protecting an individual’s right 
to free speech, the Second Circuit’s test157 is wrong textually and 
does not sufficiently protect an individual.  By stating that a 
particularized requirement is intact after Hurley’s statement 
that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition 
of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions 
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the 
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock,”158 the 
Second Circuit at first glance seems to be applying the same test 
as the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, which lowered the particularized 
threshold.159  However, by specifically stating that the Spence 
factors are intact, the Second Circuit is not lowering the 
threshold; instead, it may have provided an understanding of 
what particularized means.160  Maybe the Second Circuit believes 
that just a coherent message is needed. 
However, there are two problems with this thought.  First, 
Hurley did not simply clarify what “particularized” means; 
instead, Hurley lowered the threshold.  In fact, if the 
particularized requirement were merely clarified, Hurley would 
not have been decided the way it was because the parade in 
Hurley did not have a coherent message.161  Second, by keeping a 
higher level of particularization than the Eleventh Circuit, the 
Second Circuit maintains discretion for judges to decide whether 
conduct is protected.  Judges have to somehow decide whether 
 
157 See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
158 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995) (citation omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) 
(per curiam)). 
159 See supra notes 60–61, 69–70 and accompanying text. 
160 See Kerik, 356 F.3d at 205 n.6 (“[W]e are mindful of Hurley’s caution against 
demanding a narrow and specific message . . . .”). 
161 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70 (“[A] private speaker does not forfeit 
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to 
edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the 
speech.”). 
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something is particularized highly enough, which leads to 
inconsistency.  For instance, while expressing cultural values by 
wearing a skirt was not particularized enough,162 neither was the 
even vaguer message of needing money while panhandling.163  
Yet, a message about training and technique, and beauty and 
creativity through fighting, was considered particularized.164  If 
individuals are not sure whether their intent is particularized 
enough, they may not act at all, leading to a chilling effect on 
speech.165  At least with a lower particularized requirement, 
there is less discretion in deciding whether conduct is minimally 
particularized. 
The Second Circuit, however, does address one of the 
problems of the Third Circuit’s test:  Eliminating the 
particularized requirement will protect too much conduct.166  If 
conduct will only be protected where the actor intends to convey 
a particularized message, then conduct where the actor intends 
to convey a generalized and vague idea will not receive First 
Amendment protection.167  Since an audience is more likely to 
understand the actual message the actor intended to convey if 
the message is more particularized,168 the Second Circuit helps 
maintain the traditional conception of the marketplace of ideas, 
where the actor plays a more important role in expressing a 
message.169 
But, in the name of preserving the marketplace of ideas, the 
Second Circuit’s test stifles autonomy in two ways: (1) by not 
lowering the particularized requirement, and (2) by requiring 
that the audience understand the same message as the one the 
actor intended to convey.  On the contrary, if the actor’s intent in 
 
162 Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319–20 (2d Cir. 2003). 
163 Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1990). 
164 Jones v. Schneiderman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 322, 333–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
165 See BOLLINGER, supra note 126. 
166 See supra Part III.B; see also City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) 
(“It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person 
undertakes . . . but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the 
protection of the First Amendment.”). 
167 See Zalewska, 316 F.3d at 319. There, the plaintiff wore a skirt to express 
her cultural values. Id. The Second Circuit ruled that this is too broad of a message 
to convey, and so would not receive constitutional protection. Id. at 319–20. 
168 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
169 See supra Part III.A (discussing how requiring the audience to understand 
the same message as the one the actor intended to convey protects the marketplace 
of ideas). 
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conveying a message no longer needs to be so particularized, and 
if an audience understands a different message from the one the 
actor intended to convey, which are the two requirements 
according to the Eleventh Circuit, people are more likely to 
express themselves because there is less fear that their conduct 
will not be recognized as speech.170 
IV. WHY THE DIFFERENCES MATTER: APPLICATION OF THE TESTS 
The Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits have all addressed 
the question of whether conduct is protected as symbolic speech 
quite differently.171  These interpretations differ in very 
important respects, from how particularized the message needs 
to be to whether the audience needs to understand the same 
message the actor intended the conduct to convey.  This has 
important policy implications, for it could either deter or 
encourage speech.  The following case illustrates the different 
tests and the importance of these differences. 
A. Teenagers and Online Pictures 
The case examined under the three different tests is T.V. ex 
rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Community School Corp.172  In T.V., 
teenage girls took pictures of themselves in sexually suggestive 
positions and subsequently posted them on the Internet.173  
Because of these photographs, the girls were suspended from 
extracurricular activities.174  The girls brought an action, 
claiming that their suspension violated their rights to free 
speech.175  The teenagers said they posted the photographs 
because they thought the photographs were funny, and the 
teenagers wanted to share that.176  The court held that the First 
Amendment protected the girls’ conduct because “the 
images . . . had a particularized message of crude humor likely to 
be understood by those they expected to view the conduct.”177  
The court found a particularized message of crude humor 
 
170 See supra Part III.A. 
171 See supra Part II. 
172 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
173 Id. at 772. 
174 Id. at 773. 
175 Id. at 771. 
176 Id. at 772. 
177 Id. at 776. 
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because the photographs themselves were silly and 
inflammatory, which could be at the heart of humor for many 
teenagers, and because they were staged.178 
B. Application of the Different Tests 
1. The Third Circuit 
Applying the different tests to T.V. would each yield a 
different outcome.  Under the Third Circuit’s test, the conduct of 
staging sexually suggestive poses and posting them on the 
Internet would be protected because it is sufficiently imbued with 
elements of communication.  There was the intent to convey a 
message of crude humor to teenagers whom the girls expected 
would observe the images.  There was a great likelihood that the 
audience would understand that same message because, 
according to the court, the poses were funny and provocative for 
teenagers.179 
2. The Second Circuit 
On the contrary, under the Second Circuit’s test, this activity 
may not be protected as speech because the teenage girls’ conduct 
does not have a particularized message.  Instead, the message 
about crude humor seems rather broad.  Just as in Zalewska v. 
County of Sullivan,180 a message about cultural values was too 
broad,181 and in Young v. New York City Transit Authority,182 a 
message that a beggar on a subway needs money was too 
generic,183 here, a message of crude humor also seems too broad.  
Yet, because of the wide degree of discretion this test affords 
judges, perhaps being funny could be considered particularized 
enough for a judge.184  This is a problem because if individuals do 
not know if their conduct will be considered speech, they may 
choose not to act at all.185 
 
178 Id. at 775–76. 
179 Id. at 776. 
180 316 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2003). 
181 Id. at 319. 
182 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). 
183 Id. at 153. 
184 See supra Part III.C. 
185 See supra Part III.C. 
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3. The Eleventh Circuit 
Unlike the Second Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit’s test would 
protect this activity, and rightly so.  The girls’ conduct would be 
recognized as symbolic speech because a reasonable observer is 
likely to understand some message from the plaintiffs’ conduct.  
As stated by the court, an audience is likely to understand the 
humor behind the girls’ conduct because it is consistent with the 
audience’s idea of humor at that age.186  Perhaps a reasonable 
observer could have understood a different message from the one 
the plaintiffs intended to convey.  For instance, the teenagers 
may have intended to convey a message of humor, but a 
reasonable observer could have understood the girls’ conduct to 
convey that they are promiscuous.  Yet, the conduct would still be 
protected. 
The distinction between these tests is very important for the 
individual.  The message behind posing in sexually suggestive 
positions could contribute an idea about the sexuality of teenage 
girls to the marketplace of ideas.  But, if teenagers interpreted a 
different message from the pictures, the traditional conception of 
the marketplace of ideas is altered, since the teenage girls’ role is 
lessened.  The Eleventh Circuit’s approach overcomes this 
potential shortcoming by protecting people’s autonomy in 
expressing themselves, such as the teenage girls in T.V.  “The 
fact that . . . ‘offensive’ speech here may not address ‘important’ 
topics [such as] ‘ideas of social and political significance,’ . . . does 
not mean that it is less worthy of constitutional protection.”187 
CONCLUSION 
In the seminal case of Spence v. Washington, the Supreme 
Court laid out a two-factor test to determine if conduct would be 
protected as symbolic speech under the First Amendment: 
(1) there was an intent to convey a particularized message, and 
(2) in the surrounding circumstances, the likelihood was great 
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.188  
Years later, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Group of Boston, the Supreme Court stated that “a narrow, 
 
186 See T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 
775–76 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
187 Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 87 (1976) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
188 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam). 
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succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional 
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 
‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably 
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock.”189  Since then, lower courts 
have interpreted Hurley’s impact on the Spence factors 
differently.  While some circuits have concluded that the Spence 
factors are intact and perhaps just clarified, others have 
interpreted Hurley to completely eliminate the “particularized” 
requirement, while others have assessed Hurley to lower the 
“particularized” threshold.  However, Hurley clearly lowers the 
threshold so that only some sort of message is required; Hurley 
would not have been decided the way it was if the test were 
otherwise.  Because the “particularized” threshold is lowered, an 
observer should be able to understand a different message from 
the one the actor intended to convey.  The Eleventh Circuit 
captures this new standard best, which helps protect an actor’s 
autonomy.  However, until the Supreme Court clarifies Hurley’s 
impact on Spence, the confusion will continue. 
 
 
 
189 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citation omitted) (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 411). 
